IS ONTARIO'S ROGUE AGENCY A REASON FOR CONCERN?
Though the Ontario children's aid society has claimed for years family courts judges provide important oversight in child protection matters (which doesn't appear to be in their job description) the family court judge in this case did nothing at all to prevent this tragedy and if anything was a contributing factor.
But as it turns out some judges outside the family courts do provide important oversight and insight into the many faces of Ontario children's aid society.
After criminal court Judge Harper ruled the Ontario children's aid society had acted in bad faith in 2014 - without a trace of remorse for the harm they had caused - the Ontario children's aid society publicly vowed to appeal the decision and lost....
Quote: Barbara Kay.
What is shocking to me about this case is that the (chronically under-funded) CAS’s depthless pockets for protective litigation services weren’t enough to stave off justice.
After an extremely high-conflict family law proceeding, the trial judge awarded custody of the three children of the marriage to the father, and dismissed the Society’s application for an order declaring that the children needed protection from the father.
He found that the wife and the Society acted in bad faith, and awarded the father full indemnity costs of over $2,000,000.
SECTION 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a constitutional provision that protects an individual's autonomy and personal legal rights from actions of the government (and their private non-profit corporate agents/partners?) in Canada as represented by a government funded children's aid society, a government funded court and government funded legal aid lawyers.
The degree of protection dictated by these standards and procedural rights vary in accordance with the precise context, involving a contextual analysis of the affected person's interests. In other words, the more a person's rights or interests are adversely affected, the more procedural or substantive protections must be afforded to that person in order to respect the principles of fundamental justice.
After reading the article below do you feel the rights of the children and the father were adversely affected by the government funded children's aid society and were the rights of parent and children adequately protected?
Judge Harper wrote that that the father was lucky to “dig out from under the avalanche thrust upon him,” and that “the scars to the children” were permanent. In summary, “This was exacerbated by the actions of the Society, some police officers, some women’s groups, a school board and her employers … many of whom accepted without any level of scrutiny the (woman’s) self-reports.”
It was revealed at trial that mandatory document-sharing was running a year late, and that one CAS supervisor, tasked with providing information to lawyers, had removed 475 pages of notes, records, summaries and emails from the file. (This, by the way, is a criminal offence, although to my knowledge the supervisor has not been charged.) Judge Harper also noted that meetings were held to discuss how to protect the mother and case workers from the father.
"As the law stands now clients of the Ontario Children's Aid Society under Wynne's liberals are routinely denied a timely (often heavily censored) file disclosure before the court begins making decisions and the clients can not request files/disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act nor can censored information reviewed by the Privacy Commissioner of Ontario or the federal counter-part."
As far back as 2004, Ontario's Privacy Commissioner has lobbied for oversight and accountability for the Children’s Aid Society and been completely ignored.
Privacy Commissioner Ann Cavoukian wants to add children's aid societies to the agencies covered by freedom of information legislation. In her annual report for 2013 released on June 17 there is just one paragraph on children's aid on page 12: In my 2004, 2009, and 2012 Annual Reports I recommended that Children’s Aid Societies, which provide services for some of our most vulnerable citizens – children and youth in government care, be brought under FIPPA. I am disheartened by the complete lack of action to ensure transparency and accountability by these organizations that received significant public funding. As part of the modernization of the Acts, I call on the government to finally address this glaring omission and ensure that Children’s Aid Societies are added to the list of institutions covered.
 The omitted disclosure reveals constant meetings and emails that included Lisa Walters, Barbara Hoover, Ms. Upton, Ms. Schiedel and her manager, Meg Lewis. I was astounded to learn in the previously held back disclosure that there were "safety planning meetings" to discuss strategies to protect the mother and any Society worker who felt they needed protection from the father. Until the day 130 of the trial, I was not aware that it was even a consideration that any worker who testified for the Society might have been testifying under the fear that the father in the case might do them harm. When I pointed out to the supervisor that it was an essential piece of information for the trial judge to have, she did not even comprehend why that might be so.
The safety plan that the Society was contemplating with the police included the possibility that, if a worker felt fearful, they could contact the police and have their home flagged as "Priority Domestic Violence." That would result in a heightened response by the police. A final meeting to implement this "safety plan" apparently did not happen. No police officer was called to testify about any of this. Had Mr. Hassan not summoned Ms. Schiedel and cross-examined her as he did, the court would not be aware of this feature of fear that permeated amongst the professionals.
Quote: Barbara Kay.
CAS workers cannot be sued if they have acted “in good faith.” In the Middlesex-London case, Judge Harper noted that the CAS had “acted in bad faith.” Sadly, they act in bad faith all the time. Getting nailed for it is the exception.
Quote: Judge Harper.
 I found that the mother created this marathon litigation by her false allegations. However, the greater cause of this extraordinary litigation I assign to the Society for their failure to investigate objectively, taking a biased position throughout, and failing to reassess and adjust their position as they had a duty to do when faced with information that did not support their original position.
 In this case I have found that the Society drove this litigation on behalf of the mother. They are the ones with the statutory duty to investigate in an objective and professional manner, provide services, and adjust and reassess their case as circumstances warranted. They failed to fulfill all of these very important legal duties.
In addition, the Society never amended their pleadings or plan of care. They proceeded to the end of this 154 day trial asking the court to find that the father was a coercive, controlling, abusive person who should not only be feared but should have restricted involvement with his youngest son unless and until he received successful counselling for his severe limitations. I found that the evidence did not support the Society’s position and that "they acted in bad faith in the conduct of this litigation."
The greater cause of this extraordinary litigation I assign to the Society for their failure to investigate objectively, taking a biased position throughout, and failing to reassess and adjust their position as they had a duty to do when faced with information that did not support their original position.
Judge Harper assigned two-thirds of the court costs to the CAS — a record $1.4 million — and $604,500 to the mother. He had scathing words for the CAS, whom he charged with becoming “a lead advocate” for the mother and the driving force for the trial. He said that the agency went to great lengths to smother any evidence that countered their theory that the mother was the victim, overlooking her ever-shifting narratives, with their notes referring to her as the “Society’s client.”
 In its Notice of Appeal, the Society advances 146 grounds in support of its contention that the trial judge erred in his disposition of the child protection application. […]
 In light of the grounds raised and the relief sought by the Society on appeal, I would frame the sole issue on this motion to quash as follows: is there any basis for declaring any of the children of the marriage to be children in need of protection under the Act, either now or at the time of commencement of the child protection application in 2010?
 On the record before this court, I see no basis for declaring any of the children of the marriage, including M.X.B., to be children in need of protection within the meaning of the Act, either now or in September 2010. It follows that I would allow C.D.B.’s motion to quash. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons.
 First, as I see it, the merits of the Society’s appeal are tenuous, at best. The trial judge concluded that the children of the marriage were not in need of protection from their father. He found that the children would be in need of protection only if they were placed in the custody of their mother. Since the trial judge also concluded that custody of the two youngest children should be awarded to C.D.B., he dismissed the Society’s protection application. Thus, in the trial judge’s view, the Society had failed to demonstrate that any of the children were in need of protection as of the date of his decision (September 2013).
 The trial judge made dozens of factual findings in support of these critical conclusions. Virtually all these findings were based on his credibility assessments of C.D.B., L.D.B. and other witnesses. […] As a result, the Society faces a steep uphill battle in seeking to disturb the trial judge’s protection ruling on appeal.
 Second, and importantly, there is no evidence before this court of any current protection concerns regarding any of the children.
 Moreover, even assuming some minimal merit to the grounds of appeal sought to be advanced by the Society, I see no utility to the relief sought. If successful on appeal – an outcome I regard as most unlikely – the primary relief sought by the Society is tantamount to a retroactive protection order, that is, a determination that the children were in need of protection almost four years ago, when the Society’s child protection application was commenced. In my view, in the absence of any evidence of existing child protection concerns, such an order would be contrary to the best interests of the children. Indeed, such an order would undermine the stability of their current living circumstances and reignite the conflicts in this family. For the same reasons, I fail to see how subjecting any of the children and the parties to a new protection hearing could be said to promote the best interests of the children or the administration of justice.
DON'T WAIT TO HELP THE ONTARIO CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY ACHIEVE THEIR FUNDING GOALS - REPORT A FRIEND, REPORT A NEIGHBOR, REPORT A STRANGER - ANY SUSPICION WILL DO AND WE'LL KEEP YOUR NAME OUT OF IT.
THE SOCIETY'S EVERY CONCERN EQUALS MORE MONEY FOR THE CHILDREN!
In a decision delivered last month, Superior Court judge Lewis Richardson ruled Tammy Larabie’s call to the CAS was “unreasonable” and "there was nothing to suggest that (the baby) was in any danger.”
“It’s hard enough to get people to report (to the CAS) and this will have a silencing effect,” said Mary Birdsell, executive director of Justice for Children and Youth. “The legislation is supposed to protect people from being sued if their report was reasonable.”
Judge Lewis Richardson ruled Tammy Larabie’s call was “unreasonable.”
Mary Birdsell seems to be suffering from deep state of denialism.